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THE SOCIALIZATION OF ELITISM
NEW CIVILIZING ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE USA AROUND 1900

HERMANN SCHWENGEL

In looking at the history of the United States, f r o m the Populist
challenge in the last two decades of the 19th century until the end
of the Progressive era and the entry of the USA into World War I,
one can find e n o u g h proof for the validity of the arguments of the
theory of the elite as well as for its weaknesses. 1 On the one hand
there is the rapid emergence of functional professional elites—in
the technical-economic sector, in public service and in the new
branches of popular culture—concentrated on social centralization and the orderly interaction a m o n g money, power and opinion. T h e way in which the interests of the elites came together in
certain projects can be shown, but the mechanics of establishing a
general cohesion and consensus remain unclear. It was here, on
the other hand, that the idea of a power elite f o u n d fertile soil.
T h e r e was the rise of the business elite, the crushing of oppositional movements, the political self-correction of the overconcentration of power, the cooperation between new political and social
elites, and, as in all periods of the "American creed" (Huntington), the discovery of new networks of internal communication
and representational media. T h e ways in which the ruling elites
were able to translate their insights into functional programs in a
competitive and complex situation remain uncertain, however.
This period is, beyond a doubt, an adequate field to explore the
controversies over function and class, structural power and the
concentration of power.
T h e most interesting historical-sociological message of this
epoch, however, which opens u p totally different avenues of
investigation, came in the "elitist" r e f o r m processes of behavior or
expected behavior, which almost a p p e a r as b y p r o d u c t s of
economic development, institutional change and social struggles.
I am calling them "civilizing arrangements" to suggest that they

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1989

1

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 20 [1989], No. 20, Art. 3
33

appear to be located below the level of the processes of civilization
that were analyzed by Elias, Nelson or Foucault 2 but above the
historically manifest rules of political-social activity insofar as they
contain o r d e r e d reflexive standards which would promise a selfsustaining dynamism. T h e y affect the expectations as regards
rights, conflicts, everyday life, and the family.
It is not only historical-sociological curiosity, however, but also
a certain tiredness of the established concepts of the theory of the
elite that speak for a change in perspectives. T h e elite appears to
be previously either a complement to the ruling class, in borderline cases a substitute, or a complement to functional societalization, in borderline cases disappearing in the functional process.
Original elites appear, as by Pareto and Mosca, between their
operative and normative meaning, their technical and aristocratic
origins, to be unable to achieve an influence appropriate to modernity.
O n e can learn f r o m history and theory that by the subject
"elite" the elites are not so important as the substance of that
which is elitist. This was already a p p a r e n t at the birth of the elite
in the 17th century as elite was defined t h r o u g h the exalted
quality of its process of choice, its choices and its own chosen
position. Where this process of choice ventures into new territories that were previously understood as "given," where natural conditions or historical hierarchies limit the choice, where the
option of choice is tried out on new objects and the loss of the safe
conditions and social ascribability must be experienced and end u r e d , and where this process as a whole has to be made permanent in the first civilizing arrangements, is the h o u r and situation
of "elite"—not necessarily of the elites, as they themselves would
generally insist. T h e elite pushed forward with modernization
and modernity, had its chance as these two come into conflict—
around 1900—and showed at this point how much its representatives were tied to the hollow compromise between the bourgeois
and the aristocracy.
It suggests itself that the "elitist" process of choice that we have
identified would move to places where non-feudal conditions
allow the dynamics of modernization and modernity room to
develop as well as to remove the prerequisites for the dialectic of
state and revolution. It was, however, only indirectly new social
arrangements that were f o r m e d d u r i n g the Populist-Progressive
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epoch, not a direct continuation of independence and revolution.
T h e arbitrariness that goes along with the ability to choose is a
part of the elitist substance just as much as the extreme diversification of equality. How to handle the options and obligations
(Dahrendorf), how to make them permanent, how to find r o u n d about ways when their antagonisms threaten peace, prosperity
and happiness, how to give the contradictions a form in which
they can move: these are questions that must be dealt with by
civilizing "elitist" arrangements.
Such arrangements can hardly sustain themselves permanently
as separate islands. O n e has to assume a system in which they
s u p p o r t each other, with the tendency to rely more and more
u p o n this system and less u p o n their own history. This system is
called "the social" following Donzelot, Deleuze and Foucault, a
sector within the society like economics and political administration, in which the civilizing modelling of m o d e r n societalness is
worked on continually as a specialized field 3 without having the
society come in conflict with "community" or "kinship."
In the following discourse I will be attempting an historicalsociological sketch of the Populist-Progressive era with this goal in
mind. I will be starting with general historiographic descriptions
and will then attempt to highlight the civilizing arrangements in a
stricter sense.
With two simple circumscriptions we can come nearer to the
question of why and when the field of experimentation on "the
social" appears in America of all places, and why the elitistic
definition of "community" receives its first identifiable contours
there. T h e field presupposes, firstly, developed capitalism and an
industrial society whose detraditionalizing and civilizing forces
have had enough time, and above all e n o u g h social space, to
restructure complex experiences of generations relatively continuously, even reaching into deeper levels of behavior. With
Arno Mayer one can question whether the European societies
a r o u n d 1900 had e n o u g h time, space and social supporters to
reach such a level. This is not a question primarily of rates of
growth, degrees of industrialization, growing i n d e p e n d e n c e
f r o m the agricultural sector, etc., but rather one of whether the
traditional, cultural and political structures were adaptable
e n o u g h to carry out the modernization while, at the same time,
the cultural and political modernity were already forming the
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institutional and normative framework. Secondly, the idea of a
system of "the social" implies the relative weakening of the old
European connection of federally centralized institutions and
politically formed, individualized consensus elites 4 that were a
central variable in the early phase of the modernization history of
capitalism and civilization. This institutional framework which
was fruitful for the first processes of innovation such as compensatory modernization becomes doubtful when it can only o f f e r
the new sweeping powers that are ready for mobility and equality
the same old "aristocratic" political liberalism (Simmel) as form,
and can as contents only r e f e r to programs that are even older
than the liberal societal contract. 5 This admonishment could, in
fact, make the obvious irrelevance of this framework completely
visible, but much more likely is that it would only f u r t h e r the
traditionalization in liberal guise. Positively formulated: consensus elites a r o u n d 1900 had to be complexly organized, simultaneously federal and anti-federal and also normative and contractual, in o r d e r to still represent a fitting counterweight to the
modernity of capitalist societalizadon. T h e finer one spins out
these conditions the more they lead to the United States as the
e m b o d i m e n t of the formula for modernization. Developed
capitalism and a post-federal tradition of o r d e r is the formula for
the head start toward modernity that the USA is assumed to have,
and is the central mythology of the American historiography.
T h e post-federal tradition of order, however, has increased the
level of government, not let it die out. Political consensus elites,
who agitate periodically anti-federally, need in principle only a
"minimal state" 6 in o r d e r to give a f r a m e w o r k to the selfsustaining, mobility, equality and identity producing forces of
political market societalizadon—not only of capitalism. T h e socalled Progressive Era (from 1900 until World War I) takes on
such a central historical-symbolic role because it appears to blend
liberally the specific of the American modernity with the take off
of m o d e r n corporate capitalism after the Civil War in a very short
period of time, and that World War I and the decline of the older
European powers only put an international seal on an established
process of modernization that was already exhibiting tendencies
toward world hegemony.
T h e first politically m o d e r n answer to capitalism in general was
not Progressivism but rather Populism, which accompanied and
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challenged the unfolding of the m o d e r n economy after the Civil
W a r a n d its t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o r a t i o n a l i z e d c o r p o r a t e
capitalism, and was destroyed in the process. Populism upset
appreciably the idea that there were no alternatives to the liberal
version of modernization. T h r e e things became a p p a r e n t —
firstly, the close structural relationship between American and
E u r o p e a n capitalism, secondly the similarity of the European
workers movement with American Populism, and t h e r e f o r e
thirdly the doubtful character of American uniqueness. T h e
hypothesis becomes problematic again, however, if one inverts it
into a "triumph of conservatism" (Kolko) or attempts to fit
American history into a universal series of class struggles. In this
case the Progressivism that actually existed would disturb the
mythology of nation and struggle. It is therefore advisable to
o r d e r this constellation u n d e r a new figuration.
T h e r e is, in fact, a specifically American social innovation. It is
based on Populism as well as on Progressivism but dissolves both
of them in a third moment, the tying of civilizing arrangements
into "the social." U p until the 1890's it a p p e a r e d as if, despite all of
their differences, the processes of modernization and self assertion in the USA and Europe, in successes as well as crises, were
moving toward each other. After World War I, one can speak,
ceteris paribus, of the interrupted but irreversible convergence of
European societies with central elements of the American model:
World War I broke the constricting political-cultural chains.
T h e r e is in between a short but very important step of social
innovation which explains why the congealment into an "old
regime" as well as the revolutionary equivalent could be avoided,
a positive "equivalent" to the European war, which preserved
decisive developmental advantages for decades.
T h e innovation was not a case of the fusion of determined
planning and consequent implementation. T h e Progressive
movement had, just as the Populist's, no stated goals for politics
and political means, and did not o f f e r the blueprints for an age of
r e f o r m . T h e r e was also, in any case, no c o m m o n PopulistProgressive working program. It was rather that the curriculum
revealed itself in political learning, in conflict experiences, in the
diverse successes of enforcing and defining rights on the local,
regional and federal level. Only two things are presupposed: the
realities and contradictions of the general processes of western
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civilization, which had similar fixed problems and results in the
USA of the 19th century as in other countries, and a politicalconstitutional framework which had just been proved in the Civil
War, which f u r t h e r e d common sense and experience, concrete
religiousness and conflict, directness and simpleness of perception as well as experiment and scrutiny. No civilizing innovation
grew out of such conditions alone. Populist and Progressive elites
functioned as catalysts who extracted the dynamism that was
contained in the civilizing standards, and which would have
otherwise been scattered in esoteric sects or exaggerated nationalism, in private hypochondriacal behavior or public monumentalism. T h e r e were enough such outlets in this period.
These civilizing arrangements can be pinpointed in f o u r fields.
T h e combination of the civilizing control and internalization of
behavior—a central hypothesis of the theory of civilization—with
the emotionally based assertion of inalienable rights (constancy of
rights) is the first field. T h e dialectic of Populism and Progressivism is quite clear here. Toqueville's praise of the precapitalist
America of simple commodity production portrayed a liberalism
of basically European orientation which was politically only just
capable of producing an aristocracy, that is, capable of distancing
itself f r o m bourgeois society (a point which also was fascinating
for Burke), which continually wanted to expand its aristocratically biased constitutional freedoms in an egalitarian fashion, but
without leaving any doubt about the dominance of the concept of
constitutional f r e e d o m over that of social equality. Toqueville
would like to have taken this political liberalism and its political
class to Europe. T h e American civil war and overextravagant
industrial capitalism tore u p the conditions for this figuration and
the "consensus elites" that represented it until the egalitarian
n o r t h e r n republicanism and the paternalistic southern criticism
of capitalism occasionally appeared to be closer to each other than
to the central elements of the old liberal and republican establishment. T h a t is the historical situation of Populism. It offered in
the old constitutional forms the right to unconditional equality as
new contents. T h e right to unconditional political equality meant
that questions of societal development would not always be divided between the self-determination of the communities and the
determination of government t h r o u g h the constitution and free,
equal elections. T h e entire process and all dimensions of equality
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would have to be politically examined and revised f r o m time to
time. What "politically egalitarian" means for each individual, for
all of the individuals, and for all of the communities is, itself,
subject to an egalitarian process with many possibilities and compulsions for decisions. In this, Populism r e f e r r e d to the ideals of
the Revolution and the Civil War (in borderline cases to both) and
is, however, an answer to the new age of "enterprise."
T h e immediate political success was considerable, but limited.
Its indirect civilizing influence is much greater however. T h e
fascination with radical politics, with the municipal body m a d e u p
of neighborhoods, and with a local concept of equality which can
compete with that of free individuals survives the establishment
of a dominant urbanity after 1920 and the national, bureaucratic
and social-political way of looking at the situation which is becoming common at this time. As a constitutional alternative, Populism
would have been a mass democratic version of Toqueville's aristocratic liberalism, radical in regard to its own contradictions,
periodically heated up, reversibly constituted, and always newly
decentered in the process of finding its own social consensus. This
alternative arose with the process of forming the Peoples Party
and in the struggles of the early 90's and collapsed with them also.
After the defeat of the Democratic candidate Bryan in 1896,
whom the Populists supported after bitter internal conflicts, the
movement broke u p for the most part. However, the reality of its
alternative of the right to unconditional political equality did have
civilizing results, though not as direct as was intended.
T h e case of the Progressive movement is apparently totally
different. It rapidly gathered its forces after 1900, at the end
(1912) forming its own party. This movement was generally urban
and middle-class oriented with moderate sympathy for the organized workers movement, but with an exceedingly strong individual and personal sense of justice and a philanthropic inheritance. It was the expression of an older middle class whose status
was being modified through organization and technical advances,
as well as of the professionalization and problem consciousness of
the rising middle class of specialists, qualified employees f r o m
organizations, d i f f e r e n t freelance professionals a n d opinion
makers. It was negatively shaped by its rejection of a m o d e r n
bureaucratic socialism as well as of an uncontrolled cooperative
capitalism, which are perceived as "accomplices" of historical
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development. Progressivism was neither a political-constitutional
alternative nor necessarily politically egalitarian. However, it also
cultivated the ideas of the f r e e d o m and independence of the
common man, widened the ideas of what can be professionally,
politically and culturally chosen, and remained, like the Populists,
equally reserved against "trusts" and "government" even if capable of cooperation. T h e conception of equality is rooted not so
much politically as socially, that is, in the separate organizations
and problem areas and a civil right rather than a community
right. But Progressivism was also not victorious (if one doesn't
want to simply label the Harding-Coolidge era as progressive). It
divided its forces a m o n g separate issues, remained as a political
point of reference for two decades, but fizzled out as a movement.
What remains, however, is a new third civilizing power field
between Populist and Progressive reform.
It appears, between the threat of a business dictatorship or
Populist revolutionary dynamics on the one hand, and the factual
evolutionary dynamism toward a corporate capitalism or a
technocratic socialism on the other h a n d , that a compromise
resulted in the form of a complementary renunciation. Neither
the political claim to equality that would include individual, community and political society, nor the continual expansion of social
independence caused by power, profession and advancement are
able to assert themselves. It is rather that the constancy and the
claim, as ideas overlapping basic civilizing patterns, become separated f r o m their historical contents "family" and "religion," color
themselves mutually, and allow the political, social and individual
determination of rights to merge. "Rights" are the common denominator. Rights were already inalienable for the Revolution,
but they now become a matter of belief in concepts and o f f e r
emotional protection and orientation. "Rights are rights" becomes a powerful conceptual tautology which escapes criticism.
O n e does not ask of rights if they are constant on a deeper level of
individual and social biography. They are simply valid, one uses
them and one cannot conceive of their absence. T h e collective
emotional energies of the social movements of Populism and
Progressivism a p p e a r to have flowed into the confirmation of
rights and the symbolic rejection of all destructive dichotomies.
T h e s e dicohotomies could have allowed the Populists to be forced
into the corner of traditionalism and the Progressives into that of
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naked individualism and the cool professional power of the experts. Beneath the legal and historical meaning, rights achieve the
character of patterns of interpretation and behavior which are
emotionally secure, highly condensed, constant, and which transcend the divisions of labor between possession and work, city and
country, man and woman, intuitive knowledge and controlled
practical experience. Vagueness is their tool, history their memory; they form a center of experience without allowing themselves to be fixed. Countless generations exercise these rights,
strengthening them t h r o u g h their usage, thinking first on themselves and thus on the nation, rights become an "absent center."
People define their family in the context of such rights and not as
members of higher "community." T h e constancy of a protestant
ethic cannot convey stability anymore where the difference of
interests and definitions of life penetrates all relationships. In this
situation only the abstract emotionally reinsured political constancy of rights can help—it participates again and again at each
level of the definition of equality. T h e civilizing u n d e r p i n n i n g of
legal rights d e p e n d s on a permanence that has to be based on the
constancy of behavioral expectations in the general process of
civilization, and cannot only be achieved t h r o u g h democratic
struggles.
T h e constancy of rights requires elites as advocates of this
constancy. What these elites represent and what many citizens
love is not the final liberation of humanity, but rather an elitist
process itself, an easy contact with worlds of self-contradictory
choices collected together in a simple a r r a n g e m e n t . T h e model
does not "solve" conflicts that are primarily rational but rather
keeps the contact with selectivity open and bearable. If the process is "elitist" so is its representation, but the path leads f r o m
elitism to the elite, not the other way a r o u n d . If the constancy of
rights is a civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t , this naturally does not mean a
disappearance of socioeconomic classes, differences in power,
and the unequal distribution of the chance to exert influence. But
the possibility that the owners of capital will become the ruling
class is not only limited by the power of the working class, but also
t h r o u g h another principle of social leadership, that of the "elitist"
process of the social and its elites. T h e constancy of rights does not
allow the traditional resources of community formation (family,
municipality, nation) to anomically disappear; in fact it frequently
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emphasizes just these elements in contrast and conflict. But it
places them u n d e r m o d e r n civilizing conditions of assertion,
which eat at the traditional substance. He who sees the rise of the
social professions chiefly as a revolution or conservation of status
for new and old middle classes, that is, a field for new unegalitarian "un-elites," is overlooking, above all, the civilizing effect.
If the first field can be classified as "constancy of rights" then
the second, which is very closely tied to it, can be classified as
"political intensity of social conflict." In this point Populism and
Progressivism tend more and more to converge. T h e nationalization of America in the last third of the 19th century, that is, the
closing u p of the o p e n spaces, the shifting of the mentalities of
outer borders to the inner ones, the renewed qualitative broadening of the cultural spectrum, reaching the critical mass of urbanization, and above all the interdependence of the internal markets
and the opening of the world market t h r o u g h other corporate
strategies are the background for a need to change the awareness
of conflict. O n e can learn f r o m Carl Schmitt that the rationalization and institutional circumscription of enmity inside and between social systems does not at all do away with the extremely
political intensity of the differentiation between that which is
one's own and that which is foreign. On the contrary, the process
of rationalization also creates the risk of an increased concentration of political intensity. 7 Exactly u n d e r confusing conditions—
those the process of rationalization always creates on its
borders—is the chance great that one will concentrate the differentiation between "own" and "foreign," f r o m self and family
configuration up to nation and world, on the most extreme intensity of that which is political, the distinguishing between friend
and enemy. T h e rationalization of that which is foreign in the
United States after the institutional clarification of the Civil War,
which excluded m o d e r n slavery and its specific paternalistic racism, becomes a permanently growing compulsion. Only a small
portion of its costs could be shifted into an exterior imperialism
and they overtaxed the traditional small-town municipal structures.
Why then is the concentration of political intensity, the d e e p
emotional confirmation of one's own and rejection of that which
is foreign, relatively limited despite every extremely violent clash
between races, classes and nationalities when measured against
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the p e r m a n e n t compulsion toward rationalization of that which is
foreign as well as against the historical alternatives? T h e concise
answer is that f o r historical reasons the conficts were neither
authoritarian and paternalistically limited n o r could they be spatially, temporally, or socially concentrated. T h e answer that could
lead one f u r t h e r would be that this was only possible because the
political intensity of the relationship friend/enemy was partially
separated f r o m the concentration on persons, groups and nations
and appeared to be tied to the process of conflict itself: conflict is
the productive source of that which is one's own, the promise of
disharmony of the American d r e a m is creative, not a necessary
evil in the body of the community. This civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t
was introduced and represented by elites who showed the readiness and capability for conflict. T h e Populist-Progressive history
is full of "conflict elites." As was the case with the advocates of the
constancy of rights, their appearance meant simultaneously their
tendency to recede. T h e belief in the productivity of conflict
became self-supporting at some point. It runs together with all
social actions but without determining the contents of the conflicts. T h e sense of such civilizing arrangements is not to teach the
belief in conflict, but rather to fit them into the premises of actions
as if they were natural. T h e conflict itself is thus unimaginably
harsh, personal and institutionally relentless. But in the conflictbudget of the society it is spread out and decentralized—in a sense
t h r o u g h insight into the vulnerability and exhaustibility of this
source. T h e relationship between intensity and conflict also limits
the intensification f r o m conflict zones into structural class and
g r o u p conflicts because they are at first regarded as episodes
which, added up, do not bring forth an historical logic of "struggles and victories." Although force is always in play, its configuration changes permanently.
Above all, the inflating of the importance of conflicts—in terms
of blood and origin, or youth and community—is prevented to a
certain degree. 8 Authoritative institutions of judgment—below
the immediate judicial level—cannot, in a republican system, still
be interpreted as rulers. If conflict is the source of the definition
of self, then they cannot be socially and emotionally considered as
father (or mother), a fact which impedes every form of m o d e r n
paternalism. 9 T h e self-restriction of intensity was undoubtedly
not fully achieved in this epoch. And, more importantly, it cer-
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tainly had immense costs for the authenticity of the parties in
conflict and of the collectives. T h e s e costs are, however, for this
reason not concentrated—they localize, temporalize and separate
the readiness for, and ability to deal with conflicts. They therefore
f u r t h e r a zone of loose and unbinding harmony in everyday life,
especially in the peaceful middle-class territories of the fields of
conflict. But this zone wins its stability f r o m the fact that the
conflict is not regarded as an inexhaustible or invulnerable source
of "the social."
Only in a crisis, when the force involved with the interaction of
the foreigners, which had been progressively institutionalized in
conflict, is turned outward and breaks loose, will this structure be
empirically obvious: the primary d e m a n d for social harmony
which usually dominates, and the secondary readiness for conflict
against outsiders (race, class, nationality and life-style) t u r n the
normal interconnection of conflict and harmony a r o u n d , and
thus bring it to the surface. T h e inflating of the importance of
social conflicts in terms of familial interaction points in the same
direction (one's own g r o u p as one's "family" and outsiders as a
threat to it). T h a t resources for solving conflicts in the family were
withdrawn and that they were left on their own, is one of the
successes of the civilizing arrangements. These become especially
visible when the specificity of familiarity is t u r n e d against the
civilizing arrangements.
Another important aspect of the sanctification of conflict is that
it is the instrument which W. James had searched f o r in a different context, a moral equivalent for war, more exactly for the Civil
War, whose actuality was made clear in the late 19th century.
T h e f u r t h e r the description removes itself f r o m rights and
conflicts, the more it becomes clear that it was insufficient to
interpret "the social" only as a mutual learning process of social
movements and their elites. T h e institutionalization would be
either explainable t h r o u g h the pressure of the Populist masses or
urban-progressive middle classes or t h r o u g h the far-sightedness
of ruling and political classes. But how is the permanence of
far-sightedness and learning to be explained when the other
alternative of "industrial barons" and revolutionary workers
movement was also given? Is this really only the inheritance of the
non-feudal history where it is demonstrable that a civil war,
stormy industrialization, mobility and immigration had not even
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revolutionized all conditions of life? T h e more one removes himself f r o m the experience of conflict and rights, the more strongly
Populism and Progressivism dissolve into a new, self-sustaining
system of the social whose introduction was supported and represented by social elites. From this point of view, constancy of rights
and intensity of conflict can again be newly interpreted, as the
mass-civilizing controlling of societal experience in the society
itself. 10 Elites are then less rising functional holders of positions
or far-sighted classes, than they are limited demonstrators and
representatives for the civilizing dealings with selectivity. They
are temporary intermediary forces—operators of laboratories for
the societal dealings with that which is foreign, for the formation
of social organizations, and for the practicing of society. Why then
were the conjuring u p of the family as opposed to the city (Sennett), that of the evangelical institution and revival as opposed to
the cold modernity, and the use of force and the unconditionalness of the will to power so extreme? Because a new framework
for societal behavior was establishing itself here, which tore u p old
limitations and mediations for a period of time before the new
framework was totally effective, and the old o r d e r emerged f r o m
the power of its self-evidence and articulated itself loudly. Insecurity is shifted into the speaking out of the one or the other.
T h e third field of innovation is the association of actual empirical life and transcendental justification. T h e religious revival
movements in the late 18th century were concrete, dealt with
everyday problems, and subversive in regard to their own pattern
of representation which had been handed down. O n e d e m a n d e d
f r o m religion the confirmation and motivation of the empirical
"here and now." But it was less traditional security against the
fluctuations of modernity that was asked for as new forewardreaching combinations of the social question, the plurality of
religions (heightened through the spectrum of immigration), and
scientific challenging of the old beliefs—even when it meant that
the individual aspects could be only provisionally dealt with, each
for itself. Everyday life should, as everyday life, simultaneously
express its transempirical validity. It was not an aesthetic outdoing of earthly scarcity that was wished, but rather a simultaneity of
the earthly way of life and transempirical validity.
U p until the 1870's the religious communities could o f f e r the
individuals only communality and a moderate joy in living, re-

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1989

13

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 20 [1989], No. 20, Art. 3
45

sponsibility and relief through commitment, things that were
increasingly insufficient for m o d e r n individuals. T h e chance f o r
reorganization and redefinition was used, without that, or exactly
because, the theological challenge and the answer to the social
quesdon did not have to be resolved. It is, on the other hand, a
civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t which connects religious and social behavior without identifying them. A process of the justification of
everyday life is established, which can break down, but not because of theological or social questions alone. T h e a r r a n g e m e n t
remains stable as a rule. Catholicism r e f o r m e d itself in this process to new American figurativeness and rhetoric; it tied admonition to "social temperance" with confirmation of the m o d e r n life.
Elites illustrating the mutual modeling of communal-religious
and social acquisitions of reality retreat as soon as the process
becomes more common. Near the end of the century however,
this political-theological "populism" appears to have reached its
limits.
It would have hardly confirmed and modernized the intimacy
of flag and prayer book—an intimacy which did not have anything to do with that of t h r o n e and altar of the Germans—if its
formula had not been that of the progressive reversal and democratization of a second social institution that was almost as old:
that of the passion of the old u p p e r classes for demonstration and
distinction. On the eve of the first World War large sections of the
population, if not the majority, had reached a degree of prosperity which had shifted overspending, beating scarcity, and the
elevation by means of everyday life into the circle of possible
forms of expression of a new social and cultural freedom. T h e
justification of the relative mass-consumption could not be
moral-rational because the work ethic and small-town America's
d e m a n d for moderation lurked there. It could also, however, not
be "aesthetic" like the sublimated desire for style of the old u p p e r
classes and their elitistic inheritance, which the New York u p p e r
class still wanted to celebrate, but finally only m a d e ridiculous.
T h u s the timidity of the well-to-do, their compensatory donations
and gifts, and their desire for distinction still exist today, immediately next to the d e m a n d s for moderation and equality. T h a t
which asserts itself structurally and determines the direction is
neither the moderate-egalitarian model of consumption and
show, n o r t h e excessive a n d stylized m o d e l . T h e u r b a n -
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progressive lifestyle apparently still had place, quite early, on the
civilizing background of the transempirical validity of everyday
life. Style is not only that which pleases—the critique of culture
also comes this far—but rather everything that pleases wins in the
civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t the unjustifiable capability to become
style, that is to express their transempirical validity and justification over and above the empirical choice. In the final j u d g e m e n t ,
rational, moral and aesthetic decisions over single choices are
perhaps arbitrary but the production of this arbitrariness gives
the empirical life its dignity.
T h e old stratificatory desire for distinction appears sublimated,
without losing the desire for demonstratively outdoing everyday
life. 11 T h e civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t connects this process with the
transcendental elevation of the concrete, the social reorganization of religious communities into the factual and temporal concentration on the here and now, and the social concentration on
differentiated equality. Where that which is religious becomes
private that which is private becomes conversely, religiously
sanctified—this was a fear of Carl Schmitt a little later, in which he
had the nightmare of the deinstitutionalization of the public in
mind. In America one finds a partial neutralization of this connection, beyond the dichotomy of public and private, in a relatively autonomous sphere of the social in the society. It gives the
public character of religion a societal form in which it can move,
and gives societal time, space and chances for private work on
modernity as well. Where the f r e e d o m of religion is not only a
governmentally sanctioned neutralization of the religious civil
wars, not only a morally f o u n d e d o f f e r of tolerance, but also
sanctifies the arbitrariness of life forms, then the m o d e r n statehood has been partially outdone in its level. 12 Unconditional
belief and social agreement were not tied together as a zero-sum
game but rather their energies were shifted to a third party.
This process is neither generally democratic, so that it would
include all, or at least the most of the people, nor is it free of
charge or does it divide the costs of this innovation equally. It
does, however, create standards, and to circumvent these standards is tied together with costs that would hardly be justifiable.
T h e f o u r t h field next to the constancy of rights, the intensity of
conflict, and the transempirical justification of everyday life is,
without a doubt, that which is most far removed f r o m the
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economic and political-sociological characteristics of the constancy of rights and can be least u n d e r s t o o d as a PopulistProgressive process of learning. O n the other hand, in respect to
the theory of civilization, it is the deepest level which is here
revolutionized and contributes to the constitution of the social:
the interest in the family. Carl N. Degler 1 3 closes his far-reaching
attempt at a synthesis between the history of the family and the
history of women in America with the classic opposition of two
principles, which ideally should be reconciled but whose history
shows only p e r m a n e n t tension: the m o d e r n individualistic demand of women for autonomy, which is chiefly in a line with
market, contract and democracy, and the older antiindividualistic institution of familial reproduction, which exists in
a line with the large collective social movements f r o m nationalism
to the great world religions. O n e way to say it is that he conjures
u p a "civilization" of familial reproduction which is as deepreaching and contradictory as that of religion since the early
period of modernity.
Degler portrays in detail the formula in which the tension is
stabilized, the m o d e r n family, which has been established since
the beginning of the 19th century, and for him, despite all of its
rifts, would allow no alternatives. Since its beginnings it tied two
qualitatively d i f f e r e n t relations of production together at the
price of an i n n e r — m o d e r n patriarchal—asymmetry in the relationship between the sexes: it is primarily the m a n who participates, or is systematically subject to, the relations of production of
the capitalist market and only secondarily the woman. In regard
to the relations of production of cultural and physical reproduction is the situation exactly reversed. After a time, men and
women were able to participate equally in political election processes (in contrast to children)—at first it was only the men and
then the women. T h e political selection processes are, however,
only the democratic superstructure of a mediation of ways of
production which lie deeper, and cannot really allow their discrepancy to work f u r t h e r . T h e capability for productivity and
independence of the m o d e r n family type has to exist in o r d e r to
mediate between the two ways of production especially as they
belong to two different historical levels. In respect to the market
this capability is based on the bonds, development and concentration of love between man and woman as well as between parents
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and children which has existed in part since the 17th century, but
has become more elaborate, more general and more strained
since the end of the 18th century. But where is the basis for the
complementary ability of the m o d e r n family for differentiation in
respect to the production relations of reproduction? T h e answer
was a civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t which was first worked out in its
contours in the USA u p until the eve of the first World War and
had no complement in Europe. In the way in which it resolved
civilizing contradiction it was comparable to the other arrangements. Not the family in and of itself, "at bottom nothing more
than a relation between a man and a woman and their offspring"
(Degler) but rather the "interest in having a family" was the
specific American version of an institution which was already
modern, and which also kept its distance f r o m the division of
labor within the family. Love and interest are two different matters. But exactly because they are different, and can o f f e r resistance to different divisions of labor, they are more able to determine the internal life of the family than either an overconcentration of romantic love, or alternatives which are more conscious of
individualism and problems. As love has historically attached
itself to thrusts of individualization, so has the "interest in having
a family" attached itself to the "modernization" of necessary conditions of h u m a n existence in which direct primary h u m a n relations do not "express" institutions but rather are institutions.
At the end of the 19th century there was undoubtedly a consciousness of how far the feminist challenge to society, and especially the family, above and beyond s u f f r a g e and social feminism
extended. Degler said that the subject "family" would have been
too radical to have directly been an issue in the struggle. T h e fight
for the right to vote and the emphasis and protection of the social
and moral role of women for society a p p e a r e d thus either as an
inevitable but u n f o r t u n a t e reduction or partial neutralization of
its explosive nature. On the other hand, this avoidance appears to
me as a productive civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t . T h e institution of the
m o d e r n family was n o t directly a t t a c k e d by m a i n s t r e a m
feminism, but rather forced to justify itself anew and to compete
with other possible choices. Albert O. Hirschman demonstrated
the subtle penetration of interests into older conditions of validity
on the example of the a r r a n g e m e n t between passions for power
and economic interests: the interest civilized the passions almost
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unnoticeably until, at the end, the sovereigns are not the same as
before, economically motivated capitalists instead of traditional
rulers. T h e traditional-patriarchal history of the m o d e r n family
could be modernized just as indirectly after the other pillar, the
m o d e r n legal-economic d y n a m i s m of individualisation a n d
equality could be enriched—and better yet outbidded—with love.
T h e family is, in contrast to the old sense of reproduction, a
common interest f r o m men and women in emotional satisfaction,
permanence and the joys and b u r d e n s of having children. But
interest is not an institution, that is, it can and must be examined
with its own logic, be chosen or rejected, independently of how
often the possibility is used. This process appears at first only to
affirm the validity of the family. However, there where it is
accepted, it changes the historical experience and rationality of
actions of all participants, especially of the women, but also of the
men. Nothing can be the same as before although the topos
"family" appears to be more firmly established than ever before. 1 4
T h e "interest in having a family" has been increased, not "the
family," an interest that includes distance as well as love and which
can simultaneously strengthen the individuals for, as well as
against the marketplace, democracy, and the ability to make contacts. T h e structure of conditions for this innovation is, although
apparently not related to Populism or Progressivism, structurally
familiar f r o m the other patterns. T h e Populist answer to modernity and capitalism was also a catalyst for the linking of family and
feminism with politics. T h e temperance and protection movement was the ideal starting point because it was traditional in its
expression and however—like Populism too—already a specific
response to the onset of general capitalism and modernization.
T h e family question first becomes political here, and not already
in the Revolution, namely, the question of the quality and extent
of modernization. 1 5 Admittedly, the limits for the f u t u r e after the
peak in the first half of the 90's—parallel to Populism—were
already set by these inner contadictions. But moderation and
moral and emotional constancy do not remain unchanged in this
process, but rather clarify and bequeath two consequences beyond 1900: that the feminine resources must be recognized, developed and protected and a political veto right results f r o m the
violation of these resources. T h e other, the progressive modeling
of feminism, can start u p here.
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T h e historical concentration u p o n the right to vote allows the
fact to be forgotten that this second, feministic progressiveindividualistic, package also had its own characteristics: above all
the gainful employment of women, which met with the same
problems of acceptance later, after 1945, as the right to vote at the
t u r n of the century, and the American specificity since the late
19th century, the normality of divorce, which had a rate of growth
in the 90s' that was three times the rate of population growth.
Divorce is still to a limited extent more to be interpreted as a
strengthening of special "Populist" individualistic principles of
family than as a necessary corrective to the m o d e r n affective
family. T h e general employment of women goes f u r t h e r however. T h e d e m a n d i n g of the right to vote lies between the two. It
was the totally legitimate goal of a part of the movement because,
in a time where less than 4% of the married women worked
outside the house, it embodied the f u t u r e and dynamism of the
progressive-individualistic feminism, j u s t like the civilizing
choices of Populism. It was the main point of criticism especially
because it touched on a real issue. O n the other hand, these
dynamics clarified and bequeathed two consequences: divorce is
also a right to choose and examine the political and societal quality
of the family, and a general qualified gainful employment of
women is the foundation of the capability to distance oneself f r o m
traditional reproduction.
T h a t neither of the sides was able to establish itself alone, but
also that neither has disappeared is a characteristic of the "interest
in having a family" as a civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t which widens the
evolution of love. T h e right of veto and divorce mark out a field of
tension which does not only remind the partner of certain limits,
but also society of the general conditions for the interest in having
a family—these are a universal equality of choice, and, simultaneously, the acceptance of the qualitative differences between the
sexes. In the tension between gainful employment and sexspecific resources and capabilities, the criticism of traditional
reproduction is tied together with the criticism of the universalized instrumental labor of m o d e r n industrial production. This
differentiated interest in having a family pervaded many r e f o r m
projects of social work and education—the educational and public relations work of countless organizations, committees and
leagues which were f o u n d e d in this period, f r o m the settlement
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houses u p to the Consumer's League. It placed the family in a
network of social institutions, behavioral expectations based on
an orientation toward equality, and the abilities to discern between love and family interests. 16 T h a t this interest became capable of being instrumentalized on the other hand is the risk of all
modernity.
T h e protagonists, the intellectual and life-style avant-garde on
different sides of the barricades, were to a high degree elites, but
not because their middle-class background m a d e them so (what
for many populistic and progressive women would not have held
u p in any case), but rather because they worked on "elitist" material and crossed over historical frontiers of selectivity and definitions of equality. Tied together t h r o u g h a network of informal
relations of " m o v e m e n t s , " organizations a n d campaigns—
untraditional and unconventional also where they support values
that are apparently conservative—they represent a civilizing arrangement which introduces selectivity into the most intimate
core of societal reproduction. 1 7 T h e y have, in a way, the "definition of community" at their disposal, as they construct and express the societal ability for self-definition. An elite is, f r o m this
perspective, those who define community. Seen f r o m the perspective of the advocates of the constancy of rights it is he who
defines society elite. But in both cases the elites recede behind a
civilizing process of associated "elitistic" arrangements which
were relatively weak compared to the historic forces opposing
them, but showed a common structure and dynamics. Community and society did not come into conflict because the socialization of the elite opened a new space where the contradictions
could move.
T h e f o u r fields were not so much structurally effective on their
own, but rather in a mutual cooperation. T h e i r elements were
differentiated out of powerf ul traditional historical blocks: constancy and sexuality, rights and interests, intensity and religious
communities, conflict and nobility, before they became elements
of "the social." But specific to the American invention is their
correspondence, mediated t h r o u g h social movements, massive
conflicts, r e f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t and business, which h a d
achieved a degree of self-reference by the eve of the first World
War that seemed irreversible. T h e course of the 20's and 30's also
attests to this. Each attempt to cast doubt on the constancy of
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rights could not reckon with the "interest in having a family" in
the same way as a successful political romanticism could reckon
with the occasional subjectivism of the mythology of the family.
O n the contrary, it had to reckon additionally with the intensity of
the conflict as o p p o n e n t , and would also have the transempirical
elevation of the concrete against it. In short, each attempt to
change one civilizing a r r a n g e m e n t would have to reckon with
resistance, at least with delay, f r o m the entire network of these
arrangements. It is not a revolutionary transformation of the
institutions: one can just as well describe the history of the family,
the religious communities, the municipalities and the neighborhoods as gradual, without experiencing this period as a discontinuity, as a differentiated f u r t h e r development of the processes
of modernization which had begun much earlier. T h e civilizing
arrangements are at first enzymes which modify, redirect and
increasingly shape the "way of production" in the old institutions,
almost unnoticeably, but eventually, and then suddenly, they do
not work any more on the conservation and consistency of these
institutions, but rather first and foremost on the system and
process of "the social." T h e shock of the reorientation to modernity is experienced earlier in the aesthetic, in the pores of everyday life, and in the fringes of the communities than in the institutions. T h e Populist elites were surely totally different people than
the Progressive elites. T h e farmers, preachers and railroad worke r s w e r e d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e socially involved m u n i c i p a l
settlement-worker, local politicians, teachers and journalists. T h e
Populist masses were certainly also quite different than the Progressive middle-class base. But it is equally clear that their closeness
in comparison to the persistence of the old regime in Europe had
qualitatively increased. T h e understanding of nation as society, of
societal interaction between foreigners, of decentralized organization and political unity is stronger than anywhere else. Elites are
advocates, representatives, carriers and translators of the establishment of "the social," determined more t h r o u g h the historical
material of the elitistic as by their heritage. T h e historians have
described their biographies, their contradictions a n d their
shortcomings in great detail. It remains sociologically to ask how
long such a structural innovation can last and u n d e r which conditions. T h e idea of "the social" goes naturally much f u r t h e r than
this historical sketch allows us to illustrate. But one has to be
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careful not simply to continue the analysis, without considering
that the appropriate sociological theorems change in the course
of space and time.
So much can still be a d d e d . T h e basic arrangements of "the
social," once they have been established, function as new social
crystallization centers for a civilizing constitutionalism. New
societal system formations and innovations, like the rationalization of older ones, cannot be based on economy and political
administration as structural cores any more, but are now defined
principally t h r o u g h the structure and dynamics of "the social."
T h e course and the limitation of the social-political r e f o r m processes of the New Deal can be explained to a certain extent by the
interests of the r u l i n g classes, the economic and politicaladministrative system necessity, and the massively represented
demands of the working classes. T h e fact that a center of aggregation of reformistic social and political action already existed on a
subpolitical level can and must also be considered. T h e politicaladministrative means for a successful economic policy that would
be appropriate to the worldwide economic crisis presented themselves less in the USA than in Europe. However, instead of a
fixation on the democratic or authoritarian state that came
t h r o u g h tradition, there were political-civilizing arrangements
ready as an alternative which provided social time and space, and
m a d e possible a learning contact with new ideas, programs, and
institutions.
T h a t which I. Kristol said about the New Deal was probably to a
greater degree true for the historical dialectic of Populism and
Progressivism: the attitude to this epoch can give information
about the attitude to the "cultural revolution" of the Sixties and to
the following period of social and political conservatism. But this
question goes far beyond the scope of this paper.
Where elites are understood as informers of functional systems
or ruling classes, then they can only show gradual displacements
in the respective orders of function and class. Elite fits in there
where the theory of class or of the state, and of economy or of
society do not appear to fit together. T h e elite is here the "zipper"
between class and function. Elite, understood as civilizing resource, with selectivity then also to be able to function when all the
supports of tradition, nature, and history are weakened, retreats
into the background. In this case the "zipper-theory" of the elite
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must draw on autonomous resources. Generally it is the personal
informal relationship network of elites, however, below the determinants of class and function, and not the historical evolution
of choice, which completes the zipper-theory. Each concept of
elite which negates this difference only extends the deficits of the
sociological theory of the elite.
T h e elitistic resources can only be used there, where the historical parallelism between "elite" and "government" has not been
intensified (elitistic form of government or government of the
elite), but rather is interpreted substitutively (elitistic general
selectivity instead of governmental regulation). T h e elitistic material contains a selectivity of life-forms which the governmentaladministrative sector or even the economic sector cannot take
over without overtaxing themselves. However, it does not remain
in a pre- or transsocietal space of the "life-world." Socialization of
the elite means, as an ideal type, the propagation, enrichment
with innovative institutions of social self-determination, and interconnection of civilizing arrangements into a culture of choice,
u p to a point where they follow an own "way of production" and
form a system. T h e extent to which this process has taken place
remains an historical and empirical question. This figure is empirically more promising than the infinite refinement of the
four-functions schema.
A structural limit to this process can at least be theoretically
formulated. A "completion of the social"—Jean Baudrillard's airy
m e t a p h o r has a rational c o r e — m e a n s the limits of a selfreferential functional system. T h a t has consequences however.
Elite could no longer function as a zipper between function and
control, but rather would be socially dispersed: T h e elite would
rule, but as a scattered elite, in a paraphrase of Walter Benjamin.
Above all, however, the selectivity of the social could not refer to
anything more than the exchange process of societal systems, to
itself and to a complex environment. T h e difference in levels of
the orders of control and function, or of politics and functional
societalization, which had previously made the differentiation
easier, would actually be dissolved. All costs, non-simultaneities,
and promises of societalization and the process of civilization
would, in the end, concentrate themselves in the system of the
social in the third sector and possibly overtax it. Its effects would
have to become noticeable quite a while before reaching this
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fictitious limit. It is not surprising that the historic limits of the
social make themselves noticeable where it first arose. In this
respect, the neo-conservative termination of the New Deal in the
70's reflects the end of the American solution to the antagonisms
of modernization and modernity.
O n e should, however, probably proceed f r o m the assumption
of a generalization of this model in western societies. T h e r e b y
arises renewed the problem of the difference between the political Leviathan or its heirs a n d m o d e r n functional-capitalist
societalization, complete with its third sector. Exactly there,
where the last elements of an ancien regime in government were
most thoroughly sorted out, where "the social" had outbid the old
form of government and the revolution on their own level, the
question of the concept of "the political" r e t u r n e d with all clearness. A new concept of the political exists only after the selfreflection of this indirect mediation between Leviathan and subject, for which m o d e r n America had made the baking form. A
simple falling back on Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, affirmatively
as well as critically, is not possible any more because America has
disregarded them.
Freie Universitat Berlin
NOTES
1. I thank E d m u n d Leites, Dick Howard and the members of the
research project "Politics of Life Styles" (Freie Universitat Berlin) for
discussion and suggestions.
2. T h e more science grasps the difficulty of separating the exterior
and interior of internalization, the more it is inclined to allow the distinctions to retreat totally, and only to present material. I am assuming that
there is a network of reasonable suppositions that are capable of being
presupposed about the generally slow, directed process of civilization.
This network goes back (at least chronologically) d e e p into the middle
ages and is factually describable on a continuum between Elias and
Foucault. T h e thing that is really explosive between Elias and Foucault is
the nature of the monopolistic-governmental or microphysically decentralized (in terms of power) authority, which lends measure a n d
dynamism to the learning process of power, such as the internalization of
exterior behavioral compulsions. How does a civilizing headquarters of
the type "Elias" turn into one of the type "Foucault"? Is this change in the
axial period f r o m 1780 until 1830 to be expected, as Foucault and the
recurring defence of the Enlightenment would suggest? Is it rather on
the threshhold to the 20th century to be f o u n d , o r is it still to appear?
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3. T h e idea of the sector of "the social," which appears at first glance to
be a bizarre mixture of public and private institutions, was first formulated in the Foucault school by Jacques Donzelot (and supported in
Deleuze's epilogue): ". . . 'the social' is not the society, understood as the
entirety of the material and moral conditions that signify a f o r m of living
together. It is in this case rather the entirety of the means that free
societal life f r o m material pressures and political-moral uncertainties,
the spectrum of procedures that o f f e r the members of a society a relative
protection against economic fluctuations, that keep its relationships flexible e n o u g h and its motivations convincing e n o u g h to prevent a dissolution of the society because of differences in interests or beliefs. T h e most
astounding fact is the degree of plausibility that "the social" has achieved
in o u r heads" (translated f r o m : Jacques Donzelot,Die Ordnung derFamilie
(Frankfurt/M, 1980). p. 15). T h e idea remains by Donzelot, however,
finally an instrument of a subtle repression hypothesis which explains the
"peculiar police character" of o u r societies (p. 21).
4. T h e alternative to the "old regime" would then have to fulfill two
criteria in the ideal case (not only one as by Mayer): democracy and the
same level of capability of development to a modern government. T h e
differentiating out of civilizing arrangements or a system of "the social"
in the USA meets both requirements for the most part, but is in principle
not superior to the "federal" solution in Europe.
5. T h e United States a r o u n d 1900 was a good example for the fact that
the principle of consensus elites, who could deal with their problems and
contradictions "compensatorically," was not sufficient to reach stability.
A certain civilizing pretension to political peacekeeping was necessary in
o r d e r to transform the sheer rejection of resistance into politics.
6. T h e two basic risks are clear: on the one hand the d a n g e r to define
nothing politically f o r a long time and then to overheat in the "hot"
terminology of good and evil (Walter Lippman had seen this danger in A
Preface to Politics (New York and London: 1912) p. 2ff.). T h e other is the
danger to have no political means in reserve, when that which is political
is only created in periodic awakening processes.
7. See Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Text f r o m 1932 with a
new foreword and supplements (Berlin, 1963).
8. If " b l o o d " (like skin color) is u s e d as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r
discrimination—which of course it is—this does not necessarily mean
that the "analytic of blood" will be dealt with in a civilizing m a n n e r (see
Michel Foucault, Sexualitat und Wahrheit, Vol. I. Der Wille zum Wissen
(Frankfurt/M, 1979), p. 175ff. T h e "analytic of blood" means an o r d e r of
affiliation and self-perception that is based on descent and classification
f r o m birth on, an alliance that cannot be checked and an absolute
superiority. T h a t affiliation can also be socially chosen and created,
presupposes that the old orders of preception have been deprived of
power. This could be partially achieved through the d e e p conflicts and
the playing out of the last resources of definition.
9. It was especially in Populism that the civilizing reorientation of
small-town thinking with its conventional basis to a more strongly univer-
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salist point of view was practiced before it was to surface later. T h e
constitutional point of view always provided that the universalism did not
thin to an abstract construction that was not capable of politics. T h e
conflicts between nationalities in Populism were thus work with the risk
of racism, and to a lesser extent participation in it.
10. T h a t societal experience in society can be systematically institutionalized is inconceivable in a traditional society because the regulative idea
of reproduction is thus disturbed. T h e "social" was so natural there that it
did not provide anything of its own. "As one shows how the rise of the
social justifies the recognizability of the family, one notices that the social
becomes more foreign at the same time, as if the puzzle had only changed
places" (trans, f r o m : J a c q u e s Donzelot, Die Ordnung der Familie
(Frankfurt/M., 1979), p. 15). Societal experience works thus on the
foreignness of the social, not on its naturalness. Foreignness appears
when the elements of the social (still) conceal its structure.
11. From an American viewpoint an alternative reading of the book
f r o m Pierre Bourdieu (Die feinen Unterschiede (Frankfurt/M., 1982) suggests itself. Next to the popular and legitimate tastes there is not only an
"intermediate," which never loses its subsidiary character in Bourdieu's
construction, but also one which defines legitimate popularity f r o m the
middle (introduction of the concepts by Bourdieu on p. 36f.). All of the
second class preferences, compromises and borrowings of the "intermediate" taste could also be viewed as work toward the civilizing overcoming of the old duality between the aristocratic consciousness of distinction and peasant-revolutionary pride. Bourdieu could be read thus
from the perspective of his unloved "intermediate."
12. T h e bringing about of political peace on a highly uncertain
theological, historical and anthropological basis is the achievement of the
large Leviathan, which appears dark and ungovernable for this reason.
T h e bringing about of peace without touching the issues of the large
Leviathan, in an institutional network of the social, would be the equivalent of realizing a small Leviathan. C o m p a r e H e r r m a n n Schwengel, "Der
kleine Leviathan" (Habilitationsschrift, Freie Universitat Berlin: 1987).
13. Carl N. Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the
Revolution to the Present (New York: O x f o r d , 1980).
14. T h e d e m a n d of the woman for autonomy is no longer only an
expression of the market economy, but now is related also to the "interest
in having a family," by which a look at the conditions for the discrepancy
between the two is directed. When a new women's movement appears in
the 70's, it does not have to make u p for the "mistake" of the first one, the
orientation on the right to vote, but can rather use exactly the "trap" that
the first movement had set, namely to use "their" right to vote to introduce an alternative culture of voting in the political process.
15. T h e suggestion of Linda Kerber that the connection of politics and
domesticity is an original American contribution (as opposed to the old
European culture) appears to me to be plausible, but this contribution is
not made in the Revolution, but rather in the Progressive-Populist
period. See: Linda Kerber, " T h e Republican Mother: Women and the
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Enlightenment: an American Perspective, in: American Quarterly 28
(1976) and Degler, p. 336.
16. T h e tearing apart of the Populist-Progressive compromise in the
70's can only be interpreted as doubts as to its reality and f u t u r e .
17. Foucault's portrait of a sexuality that is not suppressed, but rather
allowed to multiply, differentiate and speak (cf. Foucault p. 28ff.) does
not only allow force as an acceptable subject of this process, but also
institutionalized social selectivity. Next to its central role in processes of
identity and relationship formation, it is above all able to be decisive, that
is to provide an expression for different social arrangements and selectivities. T h e "interest in having a family" can express itself in its varied
positions in sexuality, but the end of this interest can still be conveyed.
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